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COMMENTS
PATENT ATTORNEYS AND THE ATTORNEY-
CLIENT PRIVILEGE
I. INTRODUCTION
Attorneys provide clients with legal opinions and advice.
As a general rule, related communications between the client
and attorney are protected from disclosure by the attorney-
client privilege in order to encourage full and frank discus-
sion.1 Furthermore, if services are requested in anticipation
of litigation, the work product generated by the attorney
while performing the services is protected from disclosure by
the work product doctrine.2
Unique to patent law, patent attorneys and their clients
do not necessarily enjoy the protection provided by the attor-
ney-client privilege and work product doctrines. Some courts
have ruled that communications between inventors and their
patent attorneys for the purpose of patent applications are
technical rather than legal in nature.3 Accordingly, these
courts have not extended the attorney-client privilege to pro-
tect these communications. Furthermore, courts have gener-
ally ruled that the protections provided by the attorney-client
privilege and work product doctrine are implicitly waived in
situations where a defendant's state of mind is used to defend
against willful patent infringement charges.4 Hence, patent
attorneys must prosecute patent applications and write opin-
ion letters with the knowledge that the attorney-client privi-
lege and work product doctrines may not apply.
Due to this unique facet of patent law, the tactic of charg-
ing willful patent infringement is sometimes used by patent
litigation plaintiffs to overcome the traditional doctrines of
attorney-client privilege and work product immunity in order
1. See infra text accompanying note 43.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 101-06.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 69-75.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 165-67.
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to compel production of otherwise undiscoverable evidence.
This situation, combined with the potential for very large
judgments in patent litigation, especially in willful infringe-
ment cases, has made the court's treatment of these issues of
tremendous interest to the patent trial bar.5
This comment discusses whether the protection provided
to patent attorneys and their clients by the attorney-client
privilege and work product doctrines should extend to techni-
cal information in patent applications and infringement opin-
ions. It also explores the technique of challenging the attor-
ney-client privilege by using a willful infringement charge.
First, this comment addresses these issues by reviewing the
background, history, and policy reasons underlying existing
statutes and case law related to attorney-client privilege and
work product doctrine in patent prosecution and litigation.'
Next, this comment analyzes these issues as they relate to
existing case law and statutes, reviews recent decisions, and
interprets their possible legal effects.7 Finally, this comment
proposes some strategies and approaches patent attorneys
can use to contend with the deprivation of protection nor-
mally given to attorney-client communications and attorney
work product.8
II. BACKGROUND
A. Setting the Stage: Mixing Law and Technology
1. Patent Prosecution
The United States Constitution provides persons the op-
portunity to receive patents for their inventions for the pur-
pose of promoting the "[pirogress of [sicience and useful
[alrts."9 Issued patents provide their owners with seventeen
5. Douglas A. Strawbridge et al, A Review Of Recent Decisions Of The
United States Court Of Appeals For The Federal Circuit: Area Summary: Patent
Law Developments In The United States Court Of Appeals For The Federal Cir-
cuit During 1986, 36 Am. U. L. Ray. 861, 891 (1987) ("Because of the potential
for very large judgments in patent cases, the court's treatment of damages is-
sues is of great interest to the patent trial bar.").
6. See infra part I.
7. See infra part IV.
8. See infra part V.
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This portion of the Constitution states:
"The Congress shall have Power... To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclu-
sive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Id. Accordingly, in
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years of exclusive rights to their inventions in exchange for
full disclosure of their inventions. 10 In the United States,
"[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, [article of] manufacture, or composition of matter"1
is entitled to receive a patent.
The primary criteria that patent applicants must satisfy
to receive a patent in the United States are novelty, useful-
ness, and nonobviousness.12 Because the ultimate goal of
United States patent law is to encourage public dissemina-
tion of new and useful inventions, 13 a patent application
must disclose the claimed invention with a degree of specific-
ity sufficient to enable a person with ordinary skill in the art
to make and use the invention.14 Consequently, once issued,
a patent is on public record for the benefit of society.15 The
new ideas and information disclosed in the patent are avail-
able for everyone, including other scientists and competitors,
to learn and discover.
Receiving a patent is not a simple task for an inventor.
The complexity involved in patent applications, combined
with the myriad of complicated patent statutes and regula-
tions, 16 motivates most inventors to use patent attorneys to
obtain patents from the United States Patent and Trademark
Office [hereinafter PTO]. During this course of action, the in-
order to "promote" science and the arts, Congress established patents to en-
courage inventors to disclose their ideas in exchange for exclusive rights to
their inventions. See generally infra notes 10, 15 and accompanying text.
10. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988). Federal statute 35 U.S.C. § 154 states in perti-
nent part: "[elvery patent shall contain ... a grant to the patentee ... for the
term of seventeen years ... the right to exclude others from making, using, or
selling the invention throughout the United States .... " Id.
11. Id. § 101.
12. Id. §§ 101-103.
13. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
14. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988). Federal statute 35 U.S.C. § 112 states in perti-
nent part:
The [patent application] shall contain a written description of the in-
vention, and the manner and process of making and using it, in such
full, clear, concise, and exact terms to enable any person skilled in the
art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to
make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contem-
plated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
Id.
15. 37 C.F.R. § 1.11(a) (1993). The regulation states in pertinent part: "Af-
ter a patent has been issued ... the specification, drawings and all papers relat-
ing to the case in the file of the patent.., are open to inspection by the public
." Id.
16. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1988); 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-1.825 (1993).
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ventor discloses all related information concerning the in-
vention to the patent attorney. The patent attorney then in-
terprets the disclosed information and prepares a patent
application. The patent attorney files the patent application
with the PTO, where a PTO Examiner then evaluates the
patent application to determine whether the invention de-
scribed in the application is patentable. 17 Typically, the PTO
Examiner initially rejects a patent application for a number
of reasons and the patent attorney must respond to the PTO
Examiner's rejections accordingly.18 This persuasion process,
also referred to as patent prosecution, generally involves a
series of exchanges between the patent attorney and the PTO
Examiner before the patent application is ultimately rejected
or issued. 19
2. Opinion Letters
As society becomes more technologically advanced, the
task of designing and inventing a new product becomes
increasingly complex. In general, a new product design
emerges in one of two ways. 20 First, a highly innovative
product may be designed which is vastly different from any
other existing product. 21 Because the invention would be rev-
olutionary in nature, the innovative design process may often
be very expensive and time consuming.22 For this reason,
17. 35 U.S.C. § 131 (1988). This section provides that, "[the Commissioner
shall cause an examination to be made of the [patent] application [by a PTO
Examiner] and the alleged new invention; and if on such examination it ap-
pears that the applicant is entitled to a patent under the law, the Commissioner
shall issue a patent therefor." Id.
18. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 144 F.R.D. 372,
376 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (describing how the PTO often rejects applications as ini-
tially presented and how patent lawyers must respond through a series of ex-
changes and dense writings).
19. The PTO Examiner often rejects patent applications as initially
presented because of the demanding standards required for a patent to issue.
Id. Accordingly, the prosecuting patent attorney must engage in a potentially
multi-staged process of submissions, rejections, and resubmissions of the patent
application in order to persuade the PTO Examiner to issue the patent. Id.
20. David A. Nelson, Comment, Attorney-Client Privilege and Procedural
Safeguards: Are They Worth the Costs?, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 368, 370 (1992).
21. Id. (citing R. SMITH, ENGINEERING AS A CAREER, 84-89 (1962)).
22. Id. at 370 n.17. "For example, the design of a revolutionary defense
system such as the Strategic Defense Initiative may require thousands of engi-
neers and physicists, a few decades, and a few trillion dollars to design and
build." Id.
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many manufacturers prefer alternative methods of product
development.23
An alternative method involves the development of new
products by simply refining or improving an existing design
or idea.24 Because this type of product design is less expen-
sive than the creation of a new, innovative, and revolutionary
product, companies often develop this type of new product to
compete with an existing competitor's product.25
However, the latter type of new product development
carries with it the inherent risk of infringing on a competi-
tor's relevant patents. One method designers use to avoid
this problem is to study existing relevant patents.26 The ex-
isting patents disclose information designers can use to de-
sign their own inventions around existing patents, thus
avoiding infringement of other patents.2 7
Designing new products around an existing patent is not
always a simple task, thus, developers commonly consult
with patent attorneys to determine the scope and validity of
competitors' patents.28 To ascertain the scope and validity of
a patent, the patent attorney studies the patent and its asso-
ciated prosecution history. In addition, the patent attorney
will search for the existence of any other relevant prior art29
that was not considered by the PTO Examiner during the
prosecution of the patent application at issue.
23. Id. at 370. (citing Baker, Patent Infringement: Quantifying the Risks,
Rewards, and Damages, 1987 PAT. L. ANN. 5-1, 5-4 (1988)). "[Tlhe expected
costs and the uncertainty of competition in the research lab, together with the
expected lost time, lost market share, and lost profits, can far outweigh the
expected costs of competition in the courtroom.. .. " Id. at 370 n.18.
24. Id. at 370.
25. Id. at 370-71 (citing Davidson, Reverse Engineering and the Develop-
ment of Compatible and Competitive Products Under United States Law, 5
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER AND HIGH TECH. L.J. 399, 401-03 n.19 (1989)).
26. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., Rolls-Royce Ltd. v. GTE Valeron Corp., 800 F.2d 1101, 1109
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (considering a situation that involved a defendant who at-
tempted to design around a patent's claims in an attempt to avoid willful
infringement).
28. See, e.g., American Standard Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 828 F.2d 734, 744 (Fed.
Cir. 1987) (considering a situation that involved a defendant that retained
outside counsel to render legal opinion concerning the validity of a competitor's
patent).
29. "In patent law, [prior art] includes any relevant knowledge, acts, de-
scriptions and patents which pertain to, but predate, invention in question."
BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1193 (6th ed. 1990).
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Typically, the patent attorney will then prepare an opin-
ion letter for the client which summarizes the patent attor-
ney's research, opinions, and conclusions. In the letter, the
patent attorney discusses whether he or she believes the com-
petitor's patent to be valid and enforceable, and whether the
client should be concerned with any potential infringement
issues. If patent counsel is able to provide a positive opinion,
the client may proceed with the activity in question.30 How-
ever, because of the high stakes involved in patent actions,3 '
patent attorneys often draft opinion letters conservatively
and err on the side of caution. 2
Another common situation that calls for a patent attor-
ney to prepare an opinion letter involves client knowledge of
a relevant patent. In this scenario, the client somehow
knows of another's patent and the patent owner knows of the
client's activities and sends a formal notice of infringement.
3 3
After the client receives the formal notice, he or she discloses
the relevant information to, and consults with, the patent at-
torney who reviews the situation to determine whether any
legal issues have arisen. Typically, the patent attorney then
prepares a corresponding opinion letter which describes the
situation and determines whether actual infringement issues
may exist.
B. Privilege In General
In litigation, discovery is the traditional method used to
obtain facts and information from the opposing party. Courts
recognize that, generally, it is necessary to allow the discov-
ery of facts, opinions, and documents held by others in prepa-
30. If the client is aware of possible infringement of another patent and the
client does not obtain a positive opinion from patent counsel, he or she may face
increased infringement damages if found liable. See Underwater Devices Inc. v.
Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389-90 (Fed. Cir. 1983). See also infra
notes 163-76 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., Thomas R. King & James P. Miller, Honeywell Told to Pay
Litton $1.2 Billion Sum, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 1993, at A4. A federal court jury
ordered a defendant to pay the plaintiff $1.2 billion dollars in damages for will-
fully infringing a patent. Id.
32. Nelson, supra note 20, at 372-73.
33. See, e.g., Underwater Devices Inc. 717 F.2d at 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(describing how the defendant received notice from the patent owner and how
the defendant was initially offered a license to use the patented invention).
[Vol. 35616
1995] PATENT ATTORNEYS AND PRIVILEGE
ration for trial." Courts also recognize, however, that some
limits must be placed on the amount of discovery available to
parties during litigation to avoid harassment, intimidation,
or other similar forms of abuse.8 5 One method used by the
courts to restrict discovery involves allowing parties access
only to information from adverse parties that is not otherwise
privileged or immune.3 6
The rule of privilege is established in Article V, Rule 501,
of the Federal Rules of Evidence.37 Federal Rule of Evidence
501 left the then existing law of privileges intact and did not
establish any specific privileges, thus leaving this area to be
governed by common law and state law.3 8 Congress intended
that the courts should continue to develop the federal com-
34. Roger L. Cook, Boundaries Of Discovery In Patent Litigation, 299 PLIY
PAT. 77, 80 (1990).
35. See generally Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947) (reason-
ing that it is essential that a lawyer have the ability to work with a certain
degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their
counsel).
36. See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(1). This rule states, "Parties may obtain
discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject
matter involved in the pending action .... " Id.
37. When the U.S. Congress originally considered Article V, the privileges
contained included: "(1) required reports privileged by statute, (2) lawyer-client,
(3) psychotherapist-patient, (4) husband-wife, (5) communications to clergy-
men, (6) political vote, (7) trade secrets, (8) secrets of state and other official
information, and (9) identity of informer." HousE COMM. OF JUDICIARY, FED.
RULES OF EVIDENCE, H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1973). Congress'
final enactment of Article V replaced the original thirteen rules with Rule 501
which states:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States
or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme
Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, per-
son, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be gov-
erned by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted
by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.
However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element
of claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision,
the privilege of witness, person, government, State, or political subdivi-
sion thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law.
FED. R. EID. 501.
38. Lewis v. United States, 517 F.2d 236, 238 n.4 (9th Cir. 1975) (citing S.
REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7, 11-13 (1974); H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1973); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8
(1974)); 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7108, 7110. Congressman Hungate, Chairman of
the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, stated that Rule 501
was "not intended to freeze the law of privilege as it now exists,... [Rule 501]
permits the courts to develop... privilege... on a case-by-case basis." Id.
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mon law of privilege on a case-by-case basis.39 Many states,
including California, have a specific rule for each privilege.4"
C. Attorney-Client Privilege
1. Nature Of The Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege remains the oldest common
law privilege protecting confidential communications. 41 The
privilege protects disclosure of confidential attorney-client
communications made while the client seeks legal advice.42
As stated by the Supreme Court, the purpose of the attorney-
client privilege is "to encourage full and frank communica-
tions between attorneys and their clients ... to protect not
only the giving of professional advice to those who can act on
it, but also the giving of information to the lawyer to enable
him to give sound and informed advice.
To establish the attorney-client privilege, there must be:
(1) a communication, (2) between a lawyer and a client, (3) in
confidence, (4) for the purpose of seeking legal advice, and (5)
the privilege must be asserted by the client.4 4
2. Who Holds the Attorney-Client Privilege?
It is generally accepted that the client, not the attorney,
holds the attorney-client privilege and has the power to as-
39. See, e.g., United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984). In
Arthur Young, the Internal Revenue Service sought an audit record of the re-
spondent public accountant firm. Id. at 808-09. The respondent asserted that
the tax accrual workpapers were protected from disclosure because of the privi-
leged relationship between the accountant and the client. Id. at 809. After con-
sidering the issues, the Supreme Court held that public interests outweighed
any existing accountant-client privilege. Id. at 819.
40. For example, rules governing the lawyer-client privilege in California
are set forth in CAL. EVD. CODE § 954 (West 1987).
41. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
42. Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Lab., Inc., 143 F.R.D. 611, 615
(E.D.N.C. 1992).
43. Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389-90 (1981). See also Hunt v.
Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) ("[The privilege is] founded upon the neces-
sity, in the interest and administration of justice, of the aid of persons having
knowledge of the law and skilled in its practice, which assistance can only by
safely and readily availed of when free from the consequence or the apprehen-
sion of disclosure.").
44. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59
(D. Mass. 1950).
[Vol. 35618
19951 PATENT ATTORNEYS AND PRIVILEGE
sert it. 45 The attorney, however, may also assert the attor-
ney-client privilege on behalf of the client.46 In either case,
the asserting party must satisfy all the elements of the privi-
lege and show that the elements were present during the rel-
evant communication.47
With regard to a corporation, where the "in-house" coun-
sel is the "attorney" and the corporation is the "client," a diffi-
cult issue to resolve is determining which employees within
the organization are qualified to communicate to the "attor-
ney" so that the privilege attaches. With respect to this issue,
courts have broadly interpreted "client" to include any officer,
director, or employee of the corporation when the communica-
tion occurs under certain conditions.48
3. Who Does the Attorney-Client Privilege Protect?
In general, the attorney-client privilege protects commu-
nications, between attorneys and their clients, that are made
with the intention of being confidential and with the purpose
of obtaining legal advice. 49 However, this rule has not been
straightforward in its application when considered within the
context of patent litigation. Application of the attorney-client
privilege to patent litigation has dramatically changed over
45. See Roberts v. Heim, 123 F.R.D. 614, 639 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (stating that
the client is the holder of the attorney-client privilege and that the client has
the right to assert such privilege).
46. United States v. Fisher, 692 F. Supp. 488, 494 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
47. International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. United Tel. Co., 60 F.R.D. 177, 184
(M.D. Fla. 1973).
48. See generally Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 386-95 (1981)
(considering the attorney-client privilege in the corporate context). In Upjohn,
the Supreme Court refused to set forth a formal test to determine when the
attorney-client privilege should attach, but the Court did outline a number of
considerations. Id. at 386. The Court rejected a "control group" test set forth by
the lower court which effectively discouraged communication of relevant infor-
mation by corporate employees to attorneys seeking to render legal advice. Id.
at 392. The Court reasoned that such narrow protection would not only frus-
trate corporate attorneys' efforts to formulate sound advice to the corporation,
but also inhibit efforts to ensure that the corporations complied with the law.
Id. Instead, the Court considered factors which included whether the employ-
ees were acting under the direction of corporate superiors, the subject matter of
the communications, and the scope of the employee's corporate duties. Id. at
394. Ultimately, after considering these factors, the Supreme Court held that
these corporate attorney-chent communications were, in fact, protected by the
attorney-client privilege. Id. at 395.
49. See supra text accompanying note 44.
619
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the past forty years since the ruling in United States v.
United Shoe Machinery Corp.50
In United Shoe, the district court effectively excluded
patent attorneys from protection under the attorney-client
privilege doctrine. 51 The court held that patent validity opin-
ions should not be protected under the attorney-client privi-
lege, reasoning that the prosecution of patent applications
and determination of patent validity questions fell outside
the practice of law.52 The court also reasoned that patent va-
lidity opinions could not be confidential because they were
simply reports on the status of public documents.58 Commen-
tators have criticized this rationale and have stated that
many judges "presumably believed that while among engi-
neers, patent lawyers might be considered to be lawyers,
[but] among lawyers they were merely engineers." "
The district court in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of
America55 also held that the technical information conveyed
during patent prosecution was not privileged because it failed
to characterize the activities of patent attorneys as the prac-
tice of law.56 The court reasoned that patent attorneys "do
not 'act as lawyers' when.., largely concerned with technical
aspects of a business or engineering character."
5 7
In summary, courts in the past generally held the view
that communications between inventors and their patent at-
torneys did not satisfy the necessary elements of attorney-cli-
ent privilege in order for the information to be protected.58
This position was based, in part, on the perception that be-
cause the dialogue was intended to result ultimately in a pat-
ent, which is a public document,59 the "communication made
in confidence" element of the attorney-client privilege re-
mained unsatisfied. Moreover, the courts further maintained
that because the communications contained large amounts of
50. 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
51. Id. at 361.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 359 ("[T]here is no privilege for so much of a lawyer's letter, re-
port, or opinion as relates to... a public document such as a patent.. ").
54. Donald W. Banner, Something There Is That Doesn't Love A Wall, 258
PL/PAT. 707, 710 (1988).
55. 121 F. Supp. 792 (D. Del. 1954).
56. Id. at 794.
57. Id.
58. See generally supra text accompanying note 44.
59. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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technical information, the "seeking legal advice" element of
the attorney-client privilege also was not satisfied.60
The Supreme Court later rejected these views in Sperry
v. Florida ex rel. Florida Bar61 when it characterized the
work of patent attorneys as, in fact, the practice of law.
6 2
This ruling allowed documents generated by patent attorneys
to fall within the protection provided by the attorney-client
privilege. The Sperry court reasoned that patent attorneys'
activities include a number of responsibilities requiring legal
skills, such as advising clients on the patentability of their
inventions under statutory criteria, advising on alternative
forms of protection available under state law and drafting
patent claims.63 Thus, a significant amount of dialogue be-
tween the inventor and the patent attorney is, in fact, com-
municated in confidence for the purpose of seeking legal ad-
vice. Furthermore, the Sperry court noted that a patent is
"one of the most difficult legal instruments to draw with accu-
racy,"64 and that when a patent application is rejected, patent
attorneys must prepare arguments to establish patentability
in accordance with applicable statutes and case law.
The reasoning outlined in Sperry allows patent attorneys
to enjoy the same attorney-client privileges as other attor-
65neys. The privilege has been extended to communications
with both corporate in-house patent counsel and outside pat-
ent counsel.66
4. Limits of the Attorney-Client Privilege
There is a division among the courts6 7 as to whether the
facts and the technical information clients communicate to
60. See generally supra text accompanying note 44.
61. 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
62. Id. at 383.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Work, 110 F.R.D. 500, 504 (E.D.N.Y.
1986). As a general rule, the attorney-client privilege also extends to the regu-
lar employees under the control of the patent attorney. Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Radio Corp. of Am., 121 F. Supp. 792, 794 (D. Del. 1954). These people include
secretaries, office clerks, law clerks, and other similar personnel under the di-
rect supervision and control of the patent attorney. Id. at 794. Communica-
tions made to these persons will be privileged to the same extent as if made to
patent attorneys. Id.
66. Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 36 (D. Md. 1974).
67. It should be noted that Congress created the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit in 1982 to review exclusively, among other things, district court
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attorneys during the prosecution of patent applications is
protected by the attorney-client privilege.68
Courts have basically taken two approaches to this mat-
ter. One approach, stated in Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron
Co. ,69 maintains that factual or technical information com-
municated to the patent attorney, which the attorney will
later disclose to the PTO to prosecute the patent application,
is not privileged. 70 The Jack Winter court maintained that
the technical information conveyed from the client to the at-
torney during patent prosecution is not privileged because
the role of the patent attorney was little more than a conduit
for conveying such information to the PTO.7 ' In support of
this argument, the court cited Title 35 of United States Code
Section 112, which requires all applicable, factual, and tech-
nical information to be disclosed to the PTO.72 Because the
inventor is statutorily required to disclose all of this informa-
tion to the PTO, and the resulting patent is a public docu-
ment,73 the court reasoned that the technical or factual infor-
mation given to or prepared by the patent attorney does not
satisfy the confidentiality requirement necessary for the at-
torney-client privilege.74 The court stated:
As we view it, the attorney exercises no discretion as to
what portion of this information must be relayed to the
Patent Office. He must turn all such factual information
over in full to the Patent Office pursuant to 35 U.S.C.
decisions relating to patent matters. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (1988). Congress es-
tablished the Federal Circuit to consider these district court decisions instead of
the regular circuit courts for the purpose of establishing uniform laws relating
to patents. See infra note 173.
68. Gregory J. Battersby et al., The Attorney-Client Privilege and Work
Product Immunity in the Eyes of the Accused Infringer, 15 AIPLA Q.J. 231, 236(1987).
69. 50 F.R.D. 225 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
70. Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 50 F.R.D. 225, 228 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
71. Id. at 228.
72. Federal statute 35 U.S.C. § 112 states in part:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention,
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full,
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art
to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make
and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by
the inventor carrying out his invention.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988) (emphasis added).
73. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
74. Jack Winter, 50 F.R.D. at 228.
[Vol. 35622
1995] PATENT ATTORNEYS AND PRIVILEGE
§ 112, and hence with respect to such material he acts as
a conduit between his client and the Patent Office.75
On the other hand, the view expressed by the court in
Knogo Corp. v. United States76 permits documents contain-
ing technical information to be privileged. The Knogo court
concluded that the characterization of a patent attorney as a
mere "conduit" was an oversimplification and criticized the
reasoning in Jack Winter by stating:
A distinction can be made between the duty to disclose
how to make and use the invention and the mere funnel-
ing of technical information from the client through the
attorney to the [PTO]. The former is the job of the patent
attorney, while the latter is an inaccurate and uninformed
characterization of the patent attorney's role in the prepa-
ration and prosecution of a patent application.77
The Knogo court's reasoning is consistent with the logic set
forth in Spery, considering that, there, the Supreme Court
described patent attorneys' responsibilities to be legal in
nature. 
78
With regard to a patent attorney's duty to provide the
PTO with all technical information pursuant to section 112,
patent attorneys only have a duty to disclose material infor-
mation to the PTO while prosecuting patent applications pur-
suant to federal regulations. 79 Under the Knogo court's hold-
ing, the attorney-client privilege .still does not apply to the
technical information itself, but only to the communication
that takes place between the client and the attorney.80 Par-
ties attempting to avail themselves of the attorney-client
privilege must still establish that the communication re-
quested or rendered legal advice, and that the technical or
business information contained within the communication
was merely incidental to the underlying legal services.8 "
In a recent decision, the Eastern District Court of Louisi-
ana followed the Knogo precedent, and commented that the
75. Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 50 F.R.D. 225, 228 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
76. 213 U.S.P.Q. 936 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
77. Id. at 940.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 61-64.
79. Patent attorneys have the "duty to disclose to the [PTO] all information
known... to be material to the patentability [of the invention]." 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.56(a) (1993).
80. See generally supra text accompanying note 44.
81. Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 38 (D. Md. 1974).
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Knogo approach is more accurate because it "understands the
transactional give-and-take that occurs between inventor and
patent lawyer in the patent acquisition process."s2 The court
held that an emphasis should be placed on any dialogue in
which the patent attorney encourages the inventor "to think
critically about what are the logical technical limits of the
claimed invention."83 By focusing on the dialogue aspect of
the communications, the court reasoned that technical infor-
mation exchanged between the inventor and the patent attor-
ney should be evaluated in the context of the attorney-client
relationship rather than documents isolated from the patent
application process.8 4 The court concluded that documents
generated during patent prosecution are protected by the at-
torney-client privilege if they reflect "the ongoing dialogue" or
the "transactional give-and-take" between the inventor and
patent attorney.8
5
In another recent decision, the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California considered, in
Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc. v. C.R. Bard, Inc.,86
the situation of technical communications between inventors
and their patent attorneys.8 7 The subject communications in-
cluded those made in order to file patent applications, and
related disclosure between inventors and their patent attor-
neys setting forth their respective understanding of key tech-
nical phrases used within the patent claims.88 In an earlier
decision, the same court had reasoned that the "attorney-cli-
ent privilege generally should not protect communications
from inventors to their lawyers when the communications
consist largely of technical information counsel would need in
preparing an application for patent." 9 In Advanced Cardio-
vascular, the court reversed the portion of its earlier opinions
which had followed Jack Winter.90 The court held that "com-
munications from inventor to patent lawyer, even those that
82. Laitram Corp. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 827 F. Supp. 1242, 1246 (E.D.
La. 1993).
83. Id. at 1245.
84. Id. at 1246.
85. Id.
86. 144 F.R.D. 372 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
87. Id. at 373.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 374.
90. Id.
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are entirely technical, remain presumptively protected by the
attorney-client privilege." 91 The court reasoned that "inven-
tors and their patent lawyers often engage in quite substan-
tial private dialogue as part of the process of shaping and fo-
cusing a patent application, and that it is reasonable for
them to expect that dialogue to remain confidential."92 Thus,
this decision allows clients the reasonable expectation that
communications relating to legal issues with a patent attor-
ney, as with any other type of attorney, are confidential. This
expectation is inconsistent, of course, with the court decisions
that have presumed communications with patent attorneys
not to be confidential because of the reporting requirements,
as well as the public nature of an issued patent.93
In a similar fashion, the district court in Ball Corp. v.
American National Can Co.9 4 held that draft patent applica-
tions are also protected by the attorney-client privilege, as
well as notes on communications between counsel, inventor,
and licensee, and drafts of agreements with third parties.95
The court ruled that information must be allowed to flow
freely between a client inventor and the patent attorney
before the patent application is filed with the PTO, just as it
must in an ordinary civil case before the filing of a complaint
in court.96 The court further commented that "[t]here is noth-
ing inherent in patent practice that diminishes the value of
respecting an intended confidential communication to an
attorney."97
5. Uncertain Protection of Technical Communications
under the Attorney-Client Privilege
In summary, a clear division of authority exists on the
important issue of whether technical communications be-
tween inventors and their patent attorneys are protected. 98
Courts have generally followed either the Jack Winter9" or
91. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 144 F.R.D. 372,
378 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 378.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 69-75.
94. 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1958 (S.D. Ind. 1993).
95. Id. at 1959.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 144 F.R.D. 372,
374 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
99. See supra text accompanying notes 69-75.
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the Knogo line of authority.100 As a result, the amount of pro-
tection provided to technical information communicated be-
tween clients and patent attorneys during patent prosecution
may vary depending on the particular jurisdiction.
D. Work Product Doctrine
1. Nature of Work Product Doctrine
Work product immunity is a relatively young legal doc-
trine when compared to the attorney-client privilege. 10' The
work product doctrine was established by the Supreme Court
in Hickman v. Taylor,10 2 when it held that an attorney's
notes prepared in anticipation of litigation, even though not
protected by the attorney-client privilege, were still not dis-
coverable because they were the attorney's work product.'0 3
The Hickman court reasoned that an attorney should be able
to plan his or her strategy without undue and needless inter-
ference, and that a lawyer should be able to work "with a cer-
tain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by
opposing parties and their counsel."'0 4 The Hickman court
characterized the attorney's work product as "interviews,
statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental im-
pressions, [and] personal beliefs."10 5 The Court rationalized
that "w]ere such materials open to opposing counsel on mere
demand, much of what is now put down in writing would re-
main unwritten." 10 6
The purpose of the work product doctrine is to protect the
attorney from discovery of protected documents by adverse
parties.1 7 This immunity protects documents created by the
attorney which may not be entitled to the attorney-client
privilege.' 08 This characteristic distinguishes the work prod-
uct doctrine from attorney-client privilege. Furthermore, be-
100. See supra text accompanying notes 76-81.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 42-45.
102. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
103. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-12 (1947).
104. Id. at 510-11.
105. Id. at 511.
106. Id.
107. See id. at 510-12 (discussing how it is essential that a lawyer be able to
work with a degree of privacy free from unnecessary intrusion by an opposing
party).
108. See supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
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cause the attorney is the holder of work product immunity
privilege, the attorney may assert it.109
Since the Hickman decision, the work product doctrine
has been codified in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at
Rule 26(b)(3). 110 The codified rule provides a qualified immu-
nity to an attorney's work product and only allows another
party to obtain the protected information if he or she can
show both a substantial need and undue hardship.1 ' In the
absence of such a showing, the rule provides an absolute im-
munity to an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions,
opinions, and legal theories. 12
One important point to be noted here is that the work
product doctrine generally protects documents that the attor-
ney generates in anticipation of litigation.1 1 3 In general, doc-
uments generated by the client during normal business activ-
ity will not be classified as protected work product because
they are unrelated to litigation. 1 4' The work product doctrine
applies to material prepared when litigation is imminent; the
mere possibility that litigation exists is generally not suffi-
cient. 11 5 Thus, the district court in Hercules Inc. v. Exxon
Corp. formulated a test to determine whether documents
were generated in anticipation of litigation: "the test to be
applied is whether, in light of the nature of the documents
and the factual situation in this particular case, the docu-
109. See Doubleday v. Ruh, 149 F.R.D. 601, 605-06 (E.D. Cal. 1993).
110. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) states:
Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(4), a party may obtain dis-
covery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under
subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation
or for trial or for another party or by or for that other party's represen-
tative . .. only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has
substantial need of the materials in the preparation of his case and
that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial
equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of
such materials when the required showing has been made, the court
shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions,
opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a
party concerning the litigation.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 512 (1947).
114. See supra note 110.
115. Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 43 (D. Md. 1974).
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ment can fairly be said to have been prepared or obtained be-
cause of the prospect of litigation."1 '
2. Application of the Work Product Doctrine to Patent
Attorneys
Generally, courts do not consider the documents patent
attorneys generate for the prosecution of patent applications
as being prepared "in anticipation of litigation" because the
prosecution of patent applications is considered to be an ex
parte17 proceeding of the PTO."" Consequently, the work
product doctrine is usually not extended to protect patent
prosecution related files." 19
Notwithstanding these restrictions, courts recognize cer-
tain circumstances where the work product doctrine should
be extended to protect patent prosecution documents. For
instance, the Hercules court stated, "[A] responsible patent
attorney always anticipates the possibility of future litigation
involving the patent."120 The court further reasoned:
It is possible that, during the ex parte prosecution, certain
memoranda or recordings, etc. prepared by the attorney
may reflect concerns more relevant to future litigation
than to the ongoing prosecution. If the primary concern of
the attorney is with claims which would potentially arise
in future litigation, the work product immunity doctrine
applies; if the attorney's primary concern is claims which
have arisen or will arise during the ex parte prosecution of
the application, however, the work product rule does not
apply. 121
E. Waiver of Privilege
A waiver of privilege may occur expressly or implicitly
through any conduct that extinguishes a necessary element
116. Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 151 (D. Del. 1977).
117. "A judicial proceeding,... is said to be ex parte when it is taken or
granted... for the benefit of one party only, and without notice to... any
person adversely interested." BLAci's LAw DICTIONARY 576 (6th ed. 1990).
118. Hercules, 434 F. Supp. at 152; see also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp.
of Am., 121 F. Supp. 792, 795 (D. Del. 1954).
119. See, e.g., Oak Indus. v. Zenith Elec. Corp., 687 F. Supp. 369, 374 (M.D.
11. 1988) (denying work product protection of the lawyer's work during prepara-
tion and prosecution of an original patent application).
120. Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 151 (D. Del. 1977).
121. Id.
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of the privilege. 1 2 2 An express waiver occurs when a party
intentionally waives the attorney-client privilege by an ex-
press statement or conduct to that effect. 123 For example, an
express waiver will be found when a party knowingly releases
privileged information to an adverse party during discov-
ery. 1 2  In the patent context, a party's disclosure of a privi-
leged written opinion to a potential customer will constitute
an express waiver. This sometimes occurs when the cus-
tomer is reluctant to purchase because of rumored patent
problems. It should be noted, however, that the Hercules
court ruled that voluntary disclosure of privileged informa-
tion from a corporate attorney to employees of the corporation
was not a waiver of privilege because the employees "had au-
thority to control or substantially participate in decisions to
be taken on the advice of the lawyer. "125
An implied waiver may occur when a party fails to object
to the admission of otherwise privileged information into evi-
dence, or when a party unintentionally or unwittingly dis-
closes privileged information to a non-privileged party.
126
Notwithstanding the similarities between the attorney-
client privilege and the work product doctrine, waiver of at-
torney-client privilege does not necessarily waive any work
product immunity that may exist in the same communication
since the doctrines have independent underlying policies.
127
Hence, waiver is determined differently in the two doctrines.
1. Implied Waiver Resulting From Disclosure
a. Attorney-Client Privilege
Patent litigation frequently involves a large number of
documents. As a consequence, there is a risk that privileged
documents may be produced inadvertently when documents
122. United States v. Fisher, 692 F. Supp. 488, 494 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
123. Battersby, supra note 68, at 245.
124. See generally Nye v. Sage Prod., Inc., 98 F.R.D. 452, 453 (N.D. 11l. 1982)
(ruling that production of some privileged documents waives privilege as to all
documents of the same subject matter).
125. Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 145-46 (D. Del. 1977).
126. See generally Champion Int'l Corp. v. International Paper Co., 486 F.
Supp. 1328, 1332 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (concluding that intent to waive the attorney-
client privilege is not necessary for waiver).
127. Handguards, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926, 929 (N.D.
Cal. 1976).
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are requested by third parties. 128 In general, voluntary dis-
closure of a privileged document waives the privilege for all
other documents related to the same subject matter. 129
Some courts have preserved attorney-client privilege pro-
tection of inadvertently disclosed documents in situations
where the client was blameless and the attorney was negli-
gent concerning the release of the communications.13 0 Other
courts have permitted "good cause" exceptions to the rule in
situations where large amounts of documents were ordered
to be produced in a short amount of time. Inadvertent disclo-
sure in these cases did not constitute a waiver.'13  On the
contrary, another court has ruled any disclosure of privileged
documents waives attorney-client privilege, even if the disclo-
sure is inadvertent.13
2
Narrowly construing the issue of waiver by disclosure,
the Hercules court stated that the attorney-client privilege is
waived only "if facts relevant to a particular, narrow subject
matter have been disclosed in circumstances in which it
would be unfair to deny the other party an opportunity to
discover other relevant facts with respect to that subject
matter. "
133
One purpose of this rule is to prevent a party from seek-
ing opinions from a number of different attorneys and then
disclosing only the most favorable opinion received.'33 Al-
lowing the party to assert attorney-client privilege on unfa-
vorable opinions received would not permit a court to deter-
128. See, e.g., Transamerica Computer Co. v. International Business Mach.
Corp., 573 F.2d 646, 647-48 (9th Cir. 1978). In Transamerica, the plaintiff filed
a motion to compel the defendant to produce certain documents for discovery
that had been inadvertently disclosed during accelerated discovery proceedings
in a prior action. Id. at 647. In the prior action, the defendant was ordered to
produce for inspection within a three month period approximately 17 million
pages of documents. Id. at 648. Despite "herculean" efforts on the part of the
defendant to screen out privileged documents, a small number of protected doc-
uments were inadvertently disclosed. Id. at 648-49.
129. Hercules, 434 F. Supp. at 156 ("In general, the voluntary waiver by a
client, without limitation, of one or more privileged documents passing between
a certain attorney and the client discussing a certain subject waives the privi-
lege as to all communications between the same attorney and the same client
on the same subject.").
130. Mendenhall v. Barber-Green Co., 531 F. Supp. 951, 954 (N.D. IlM. 1982).
131. Transmerica Computer, 573 F.2d at 650-51.
132. Underwater Storage, Inc. v. U.S. Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546, 549 (D.
D.C. 1970).
133. Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 156 (D. Del. 1977).
134. See infra note 148 and accompanying text.
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mine the reasonableness of the party's reliance on the
favorable opinion.' 3 5 Thus, if the party waives the attorney-
client privilege for the communications between himself or
herself and one of the attorneys, the party also waives the
attorney-client privilege for the communications between
himself or herself and all the other attorneys for information
related to the same subject matter.13 6
b. Work Product
Unlike the attorney-client privilege, disclosure of a pro-
tected document does not automatically waive work product
immunity on other documents relating to the same subject
matter. 13 7 The Hercules court stated that inadvertent waiver
of the attorney-client privilege by the client does not neces-
sarily also waive work product immunity as to an attorney's
documents produced on the same subject.13 8 The Hercules
court reasoned that "attorney-client privilege is [the] client's
privilege, while work product immunity may be invoked only
by [the] attorney." 39
The logic behind this reasoning becomes evident upon
consideration of the rationales underlying the two different
doctrines. The attorney-client privilege is based upon a confi-
dential relationship, while the work product doctrine is in-
tended to address the need of an attorney to prepare for liti-
gation without interference.' 40 The Circuit Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia explained in United States v.
American Telephone and Telegraph Co. 141 that the goal of the
work product doctrine is not to protect a confidential relation-
ship, but rather to promote the adversary system by protect-
ing an attorney's trial preparations from discovery attempts
by the opponent.' 42 The court concluded that, while a volun-
tary disclosure of a privileged communication to an un-
135. Technitrol, Inc. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 181 U.S.P.Q. 731, 732 (N.D. Ill.
1974).
136. See generally International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. United Tel. Co., 60
F.R.D. 177, 185 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
137. See generally Handguards, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp.
926, 929 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
138. Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 156 (D. Del. 1977).
139. Id.
140. Handguards, 413 F. Supp. at 929-30.
141. 642 F.2d 1285 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
142. Id. at 1299 ("[Work product [immunity] does not exist to protect a confi-
dential relationship, but rather to promote the adversary system by safeguard-
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privileged party would waive the attorney-client privilege,
the disclosure would not correspondingly waive the work
product immunity associated with that disclosure. 143 Thus, a
waiver of attorney-client privilege will not necessarily result
in a waiver of work product immunity.
2. Waiver By Relying Upon Opinions of Counsel
a. Attorney-Client Privilege
A waiver of the attorney-client privilege occurs when a
client discloses to an unprivileged party an opinion letter ad-
dressing the validity, enforceability, or infringement of a
competitor's patent. 14 When considering an intentional dis-
closure of opinions of counsel, courts have applied the same
reasoning used for implied waiver. More particularly, courts
generally rule that waiver of attorney-client privilege con-
cerning an individual communication effectively waives at-
torney-client privilege concerning all communications related
to the same subject matter. 45
Courts commonly consider fairness when addressing
whether there has been a waiver of an attorney-client privi-
lege. As a general rule, courts do not allow parties to waive
privilege on only favorable documents relating to a particular
subject matter. 46 In the interest of fairness, once a party
discloses privileged information, whether the disclosure was
voluntary or inadvertent, the privilege is waived as to the
rest of the documents relating to the same issue. 47 Courts
reason that they do not want parties to waive selectively the
privilege on only favorable communications, and then deny
production of unfavorable documents on the grounds of
privilege. 148
ing the fruits of an attorney's trial preparations from the discovery attempts of
the opponent.").
143. Id. ("We conclude, then, that while the mere showing of a voluntary dis-
closure to a third person will generally suffice to show waiver of the attorney-
client privilege, it should not suffice in itself for waiver of the work product
privilege.").
144. Abbott Lab. v. Baxter Travenol Lab., Inc., 676 F. Supp. 831, 832 (N.D.
IM. 1987).
145. Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 156 (D. Del. 1977).
146. Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1161 (D.S.C.
1975).
147. Id.
148. Hercules, 434 F. Supp. at 156. See also Duplan, 397 F. Supp. at 1161-62
("When a client voluntarily waives the privilege as to some documents that the
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Courts have applied this theory in several different ways.
In Smith v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.,149 the attorney, act-
ing on behalf of the client, voluntarily sent to the opposing
party a copy of an opinion letter which advised that the cli-
ent's patent was being infringed. 150 The Alyeska court held
that the attorney-client privilege was waived for all commu-
nications related to the subject matter of the opinion letter. 151
In Handguards, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson,152 the de-
fendant intended to call as witnesses three lawyers who were
involved in the litigation of prior patent infringement suits.
The Handguards court ruled that relevant documents were
discoverable because reliance upon the testimony of the law-
yers waived the attorney-client privilege.
153
In an unpublished decision, the court in In re Ethicon,
Inc. and Johnson & Johnson Hospital Services, Inc. 15 4 ruled
that a "[d]efendant's reliance on the advice of counsel as de-
fense to the charge of willful infringement waives attorney-
client privilege with respect to all documents pertaining to
infringement, and not simply documents relating to willful
infringement."155
b. Work Product
As discussed earlier, the work product doctrine is not al-
ways waived in the same manner as the attorney-client privi-
lege. 156 The court in United States v. American Telephone
and Telegraph Co.157 reasoned that the work product doc-
client considers not damaging and asserts the privilege as to other documents
that the client considers damaging, the rule compelling production of all docu-
ments becomes applicable. The reason behind the rule is one of basic fair-
ness."). Other courts have stated that the "privilege was intended as a shield,
not a sword." International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. United Tel. Co., 60 F.R.D. 177,
185 (M.D. Fla. 1973); Pitney-Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 86 F.R.D. 444,446 (S.D. Fla.
1980). Thus, a "party may not insist upon the protection of the privilege for
damaging communications while disclosing other selected communications be-
cause they are self-serving." International Tel. & Tel., 60 F.R.D. at 185.
149. 538 F. Supp. 977 (D. Del. 1982).
150. Id. at 980.
151. Id. at 982.
152. 413 F. Supp. 926 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
153. See id. at 933.
154. No. 368, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 14268 (Fed. Cir. March 11, 1993).
155. In re Ethicon, Inc. and Johnson & Johnson Hosp. Serv., Inc., No. 368,
1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 14268 at *3 (Fed. Cir. March 11, 1993) (emphasis added).
156. See supra text accompanying notes 137-42.
157. 642 F.2d 1285 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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trine is designed to protect against disclosure of protected in-
formation to the opposing party and that "[a] disclosure made
in the pursuit of... trial preparation, and not inconsistent
with maintaining secrecy against opponents, should be al-
lowed without waiver of [the work product doctrine]."
1 58
Like the attorney-client privilege, however, intentional
disclosure of documents protected by the work product doc-
trine generally waives the protection.1 59 For example, in
Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 160 the defendants included
reliance upon opinions of counsel as an essential element of
their defense, which resulted in waiver of the attorney-client
privilege and work product immunity concerning the commu-
nications.161 The district court stated that "defendant's
reliance in this litigation upon the advice of counsel ...
overcomes the attorney's work-product privilege for
documents."' 62
3. State of Mind Waiver
In patent infringement actions, it is common for the
plaintiff to accuse the defendant of willful patent infringe-
ment in order to receive increased damages.' 63 In response,
158. Id. at 1299.
159. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 80 F.R.D. 718, 725 (N.D. Ill. 1978);
Handguards, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926, 931 (N.D. Cal.
1976).
160. 80 F.R.D. 718 (N.D. IMI. 1978).
161. Id. at 725.
162. Id.
163. Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 284, plaintiffs are entitled to receive up to
treble damages for exceptional patent infringement cases. 35 U.S.C. § 284
states:
Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant dam-
ages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less
than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the in-
finger, together with interest and costs as fixed by the court.
When the damages are not found by a jury, the court shall assess them.
In either event the court may increase the damages up to three times
the amount found or assessed. The court may receive expert testimony
as an aid to the determination of damages or of what royalty would be
reasonable under the circumstances.
35 U.S.C. § 284 (1988). An award of treble damages is within the discretion of
the district court in patent actions for exceptional cases such as those where the
jury has found defendants liable for willful or wanton infringement. Baum-
stimler v. Rankin, 677 F.2d 1061, 1073 (5th Cir. 1982). It should be noted, how-
ever, that 35 U.S.C. § 284 does not require an award of treble damages for will-
ful infringement; rather, the statute provides the court discretion to increase
the award up to three times actual damages.
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the defendant typically claims that his or her infringing ac-
tivities, if there are any at all, were committed in good faith
and that the defendant, therefore, did not willfully infringe.
In order to demonstrate his or her good faith, the defendant
may then find it necessary to produce evidence, such as an
opinion letter from a patent attorney,164 establishing the de-
fendant's claim of good faith.
In a situation where the party pleads a good faith reli-
ance on opinions of counsel, the party's state of mind be-
comes an issue. Courts have acknowledged that, in those
cases, to determine whether a party actually had a good faith
reliance, the subjective intention of the party in making such
a claim must be investigated.1 65 Courts have recognized that
good faith intentions are manifested in attorney-client com-
munications.' 66 As a result, parties waive their attorney-cli-
ent privilege on all relevant communications with counsel by
raising the defense of good faith reliance.' 67 The reason for
this rule is that when a party voluntarily injects his or her
state of mind into evidence, as a matter of fairness, any pro-
tected information relating to the same subject matter be-
comes relevant and is no longer protected by the privilege.1
6 8
The determination of whether a defendant's infringe-
ment was willful or non-willful requires consideration of both
subjective and objective elements.169 The subjective element
is the alleged infringer's state of mind as to whether he or she
actually thought he or she was infringing.170 The objective
element is the reasonableness of the defendant's actions
under the circumstances.' 7 '
164. See supra part II.A.2 and infra part IV.C.2 for detailed discussions con-
cerning opinion letters from patent attorneys.
165. United States v. Exxon Corp., 94 F.R.D. 246, 248 (D. D.C. 1981) ("[Tlhe
determination of good faith reliance necessarily turns upon the subjective in-
tention of the party claiming reliance .....
166. Id.
167. Id. at 249.
168. Stanley L. Amberg, Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege by Asserting a
Good-Faith State of Mind Defense, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 271, 274
(1991).
169. Id. at 273.
170. Id.
171. Amberg, supra note 168, at 273-74.
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a. Affirmative Duty of Care Placed on Potential
Infringer
Prior to 1983, patent owners bore the burden of proving
that the alleged infringer acted in bad faith and, therefore,
willfully infringed the patent.172 The Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, 173 however, significantly reduced this burden
when it held in Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen
Co., Inc. 174 that when "a potential infringer has actual notice
of another's patent rights, he has an affirmative duty to exer-
cise due care to determine whether or not he is infringing."
175
The court further ruled that "an affirmative duty includes...
the duty to seek and obtain competent legal advice from coun-
sel before the initiation of any possible infringing activity."176
Thus, the Underwater court shifted the burden from the pat-
ent owner to the alleged infringer by imposing on the alleged
infringer the burden of establishing compliance with the af-
firmative duty of due care-rather than placing on the patent
owner the burden of showing non-compliance.
177
One consequence of the Underwater Devices decision is
that a plaintiff does not have to prove the bad faith state of
mind of a patent infringer. The plaintiff only needs to prove
172. See, e.g., Artmoore Co. v. Dayless Mfg., 208 F.2d 1, 5 (7th Cir. 1953); see
also infra text accompanying notes 174-79.
173. Commentators have characterized the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit as, in effect, the "court of last resort" for patent attorneys because the
U.S. Supreme Court rarely accepts patent cases for review. Richard B.
Schmidt, Battle Erupts Over Federal Circuit Seat, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 1993, at
110. Federal statute 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) provides, "The United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction... of an appeal
from a final decision of a district court... if the jurisdiction of that court was
based ... on section 1338 of this title." 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (1988). Federal
statute 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) states, "(T]he district courts shall have original ju-
risdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to pat-
ents." 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988). The Federal Courts Improvement Act of
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982) established the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and conferred upon that court exclusive juris-
diction over appeals involving patents. Weisberg v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 763
F.2d 1436, 1437 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Congress created the Federal Circuit for the
purpose of providing a forum that would "increase doctrinal stability in the field
of patent law." Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564,
1573 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Accordingly, federal district courts considering patent
matters are bound by the substantive patent law set forth by the Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit. Id. at 1573.
174. 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
175. Id. at 1389.
176. Id. at 1390.
177. Amberg, supra note 168, at 273.
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that the infringer knew of the patent and its relation to the
infringer's activities, and thereafter began or continued the
infringing acts. 178 These elements of proof are sufficient to
shift the burden to the defendant to prove compliance with
the affirmative duty to exercise due care.
179
When considering willful infringement cases, the Federal
Circuit has also ruled that it is necessary for the courts to
look at the totality of circumstances presented in the case 80
and determine "whether a reasonable person would pru-
dently conduct himself with any confidence that the courts
might hold the patent [not infringed]."1 8 '
b. Opinion Letter from Counsel
One of the most common and effective defenses an al-
leged patent infringer can use to counter a willful patent in-
fringement charge involves the production of an opinion let-
ter from patent counsel which concludes that the defendant's
activities do not infringe. By claiming good faith reliance on
the opinion letter, the defendant can demonstrate that he or
she did not willfully infringe.
Although the affirmative duty of due care includes the
duty to seek and obtain competent legal advice from counsel,
there is no per se rule that the potential infringer must ob-
tain an opinion letter from patent counsel, because, in theory,
the court should always look at the "totality of circum-
stances." 8 2 Practically speaking, however, courts frequently
consider advice from patent counsel to be a key factor when
determining willful infringement.1
83
Possession of a favorable written opinion from patent
counsel, however, will not always exculpate a defendant.1
8 4
In Underwater, even though the defendant had a favorable
178. Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d at 1390.
179. Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc, 717 F.2d 1380,
1390 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
180. Radio Steel & Mfg. v. MTD Prod., Inc., 788 F.2d 1554, 1559 (Fed. Cir.
1986); Central Soya Co. v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir.
1983); Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d at 1390.
181. Central Soya, 723 F.2d at 1577.
182. King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 867 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
183. 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABIL-
TIY, VALIDrrY, AND INFRNGEMENT § 20.03[4][v], at 20-185 (1994).
184. Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1390
(Fed. Cir. 1983).
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written opinion from in-house counsel, the court concluded
that the defendant was not justified in his claim of good faith
reliance.1 8 5 The court noted that the defendant knew the
opinion was from his own in-house counsel and concluded
that the defendant could not reasonably rely upon that opin-
ion.18 6 While obtaining advice solely from in-house counsel is
not, in itself, enough to establish lack of good faith, the
Underwater court ruled that it serves as a factor to be
considered.
18 7
Hence, for an opinion letter to be most effective and con-
vincing, it should come from outside patent counsel. Further-
more, counsel should provide detailed analyses and conclu-
sions supported by thorough independent research. The
Federal Circuit has given little evidentiary weight to con-
clusory opinion letters with little supporting evidence.'88
c. The Harsh Dilemma: Sacrifice the Privilege or a
Meaningful Defense
As discussed previously, once a defendant relies on an
opinion letter from counsel as a defense to willful infringe-
ment, the defendant has effectively waived the attorney-cli-
ent privilege on all other communications related to the same
subject matter. 8 9
The affirmative duty of a potential patent infringer to
seek and obtain competent legal advice may conceivably lead
to a negative inference if the opinion letter is not pro-
duced.1 90 The Federal Circuit ruled in Kloster Speedsteel AB
v. Crucible Inc.,191 that an alleged infringer's silence concern-
ing reliance on the attorney-client privilege would warrant
the conclusion that he or she either received an unfavorable
opinion from counsel, or he or she did not obtain advice from
counsel altogether, breaching his or her "affirmative duty of
due care."192 The Federal Circuit adhered to this rationale
185. Id. at 1390-91.
186. Id. at 1390.
187. Id.
188. See Kori Corp. v. Wilco Marsh Buggies and Draglines, Inc., 761 F.2d
649, 656 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
189. See supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
190. Kioster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir.
1986); Fromson v. Western Litho Plate and Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1572-73
(Fed. Cir. 1988).
191. 793 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
192. Id. at 1580.
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when it considered Fromson v. Western Litho Plate and Sup-
ply Co.,193 and ruled: "Where the [alleged] infringer fails to
introduce an exculpatory opinion of counsel at trial, a court
must be free to infer that either no opinion was obtained or if
an opinion were obtained, it was contrary to the infringer's
desire .... "194
This negative inference creates a harsh dilemma 195 for
willful patent infringement defendants-disclose the opinion
letter and waive attorney-client privilege on all related com-
munications, or assert the attorney-client privilege and allow
the negative inference to be presumed. The district court in
Abbott Laboratories v. Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc. 1
96
characterized this situation as a "choice ... between a com-
plete sacrifice of the privilege or a complete sacrifice of the
defense. This choice ... is too harsh and a defendant should
not be required to make it." 197 The Abbott court, however,
was able to justify this dilemma by reasoning that a defend-
ant who waives privilege does not necessarily waive a consti-
tutional right, because there is no recognized general consti-
tutional right to privacy. 9 " Consequently, under current
law, an alleged willful infringer may find it necessary to
waive the attorney-client privilege to all communications that
may evidence his good faith state of mind.
Once privilege has been waived, however, some courts
may make efforts to limit the extent of waiver. In Smith v.
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. ,199 the district court limited the
waiver to all communications that related to the infringe-
ment by the defendant.20 °
III. IDENTIFICATION OF PROBLEMS
1) A significant portion of the communications and work
product a patent attorney generates during the preparation
and prosecution of a patent application may not be protected
193. 853 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
194. Id. at 1572-73.
195. Abbott Lab. v. Baxter Travenol Lab., Inc., 676 F. Supp. 831, 832-33
(N.D. Il1. 1987).
196. 676 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
197. Id. at 832-33.
198. Id. at 833 ("The privilege he waives has no arguable constitutional basis
and will not unless a general constitutional right of privacy is recognized.").
199. 538 F. Supp. 977 (D. Del. 1982).
200. Id. at 982.
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by the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine
even though the patent attorney is working in a legal
capacity.2° '
2) When faced with a charge of willful patent infringe-
ment, alleged patent infringers must confront a harsh di-
lemma. If the alleged infringer discloses an opinion letter
from patent counsel which establishes that the alleged in-
fringer acted in good faith, the alleged infringer implicitly
waives the attorney-client privilege and work product immu-
nity on the subject matter contained in the letter.2 °2 If the
alleged infringer chooses not to disclose the opinion letter, a
negative inference maybe drawn and the burden of the al-
leged infringer to establish good-faith and compliance with
an affirmative duty of due care is virtually impossible to
meet.2 o3
IV. ANALYsIs
A. Attorney-Client Privilege Protection During Patent
Prosecution
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has not yet
substantively ruled on the issue of whether attorney-client
communications of a technical nature made in anticipation or
during the prosecution of a patent application are protected
by the attorney-client privilege. As a result, lower district
courts do not have uniform guidelines addressing this issue.
Even though a number of district courts have extended the
attorney-client privilege to protect attorney-client technical
communications during patent prosecution, other district
courts have not yet followed suit.20 4 Accordingly, jurisdic-
tions are split with regard to the amount of protection pro-
vided by the attorney-client privilege. Hence, a prudent pat-
ent attorney should treat all communications as unprotected,
201. See supra text accompanying notes 51-57, 69-75.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 129, 167.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 190-94.
204. Compare Advanced Cardiovascular Sys. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 144 F.R.D.
372, 374 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (reversing a portion of an earlier opinion and rejecting
the notion that the attorney-client privilege should not presumptively protect
private attorney-client communications of technical information related to a
patent application) with Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Lab., Inc., 143 F.R.D.
611, 616 (E.D.N.C. 1992) (concluding that the attorney-client privilege does not
protect communications consisting primarily of technical information made to a
patent attorney from an inventor for the purpose of a patent application).
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even if the patent attorney considers the communication to be
legal and the communication would be otherwise privileged
in a different legal context.
B. Implicit Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege
The Federal Circuit rulings have created a harsh di-
lemma which alleged patent infringers must face. In a typi-
cal legal context, a defendant should have the choice of either
waiving the attorney-client privilege and producing any pro-
tected documents, or asserting the attorney-client privilege
and withholding disclosure of all protected documents. With
the risk of waiving the privilege to a large number of docu-
ments related to the same subject matter, it is conceivable
that, strategically, a defendant may not wish to produce an
opinion letter from counsel-even if the defendant is in pos-
session of a favorable opinion letter.
The courts have effectively shifted the burden of estab-
lishing willfulness or non-willfulness from the plaintiff to the
defendant. 20 5 Thus, a situation of presumed liability may
arise when a patent owner accuses an alleged infringer of
willful infringement and the defendant chooses not to pro-
duce a favorable opinion letter.20 6
Commentators have criticized this line of thought argu-
ing that these decisions deprive defendants of their Fifth
Amendment rights against self-incrimination and to due pro-
cess of law.20 7 District courts are also aware of this regretta-
ble situation, as articulated by the Northern District Court of
Illinois in Abbott.2 °8
C. Strategies and Approaches to Address Implicit Waiver
Patent attorneys should always be aware of the possibil-
ity of a waiver of privilege, and should conduct business activ-
ities with a high degree of discretion. Once threatened with
a lawsuit, disclosure of documents and loss of privilege may
be necessary. The following discussion introduces some
205. See supra text accompanying notes 174-77.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 190-94.
207. See Nelson, supra note 20, at 394-410 (submitting that the Kloster and
Fromson decisions violate defendants' Fifth Amendment rights against self-in-
crimination and due process of law, as well as conflict with defendants' Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial and violate defendants' Sixth Amendment
right to effective counsel).
208. See supra text accompanying note 197.
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strategies patent attorneys may wish to consider in order to
mitigate the loss of these immunities.
1. How To Treat Communications With Others
One of the most effective ways for an attorney to protect
clients from the risk of disclosure of harmful privileged com-
munications involves warning clients of these risks up front.
A good rule is to assume the worst case scenario-that all
communications are discoverable in future litigation. This is
especially true in patent litigation, due to the precarious na-
ture of privileges in patent law.
One point that should be discussed with the client at the
outset is that the client is unqualified to make legal opinions
with regard to a patent. Therefore, the client must be careful
to avoid documenting any independent conclusions as fact
before the patent attorney is able to assess the situation prop-
erly. The following client letter to a patent attorney illus-
trates an example of poor judgment:
To: Pat Attorney
From: Stuart Pidd, ABC Company
Re: XYZ Company Patents
XYZ Company sent me a letter the other day accusing
me of infringing two of XYZ Company's patents. I don't
use the first patent, but I do use the second patent. Can




There are several lessons to be learned from this letter. First,
the client should avoid making unnecessary judgments. The
client should have allowed patent counsel to make the deter-
mination of whether ABC Company infringes the second
patent.
Second, the client should use discretion when phrasing
messages. As a rule, clients should be counseled not to inject
conclusions and gratuitous statements into communications.
Instead, only statements that are essential for understanding
the factual context of the communication should be made.
Any unnecessary facts or conclusions should be avoided 20 9 be-
209. Michael Macklin, A Prescription For Avoiding Litigation, TEx. LAW.,
Mar. 1, 1993, at 14.
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cause the client is probably unqualified to understand fully
the nature of the situation. For the purposes of discussion,
assume a related patent infringement lawsuit subsequently
arises, and it is necessary to produce the above letter during
discovery. The sentence, "I don't use the first patent, but I do
use the second patent," could pose serious problems and em-
barrassment during litigation when presented to a jury. In-
stead of risking such consequences, the client could have
written, "It is uncertain whether ABC Company infringes
any of the patents-please advise." This version of the letter
would be far less damaging in the event it is introduced into
evidence during willful patent infringement litigation.
The client can also take steps to limit the scope of waiver.
One such practice involves using one law firm to obtain an
infringement opinion letter and a second law firm for litiga-
tion. As a result, if the client is forced to produce an opinion
letter from counsel, communications made with the second
law firm may be shielded from discovery because the commu-
nications did not provide the opinion.
With regard to patent attorneys, a prudent practice to
follow involves drafting all opinion letters as if they were to
be interpreted by a jury because the jury may ultimately ex-
amine and make a willful infringement decision based on the
letter. Hence, the patent attorney should ensure that all con-
clusions are well reasoned, researched, and understandable
to a layperson.
Another recommended practice for attorneys is to mark
clearly all privileged documents as such. Strict exercise of
this practice could help prevent accidental disclosure, and the
subsequent waiver of privilege. In addition, clear labeling of
documents may prevent waiver in certain jurisdictions where
the courts have preserved the privilege of inadvertently dis-
closed documents, so long as they are clearly confidential in
nature.
210
210. Cf Parkway Gallery v. Kittinger/Pa. House Group, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 46,
50 (M.D.N.C. 1987) (suggesting that a court may consider the reasonableness of
the precautions taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure in view of the extent of
document production); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Garvey, 109 F.R.D. 323, 330
(N.D. Cal. 1985) (stating a major focus of courts in determining whether inad-
vertent disclosure of privileged material has destroyed the attorney-client privi-
lege is the degree of care used to protect the documents); American Standard
Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 828 F.2d 734, 746 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding no waiver of attor-
643
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
A final rule to follow for both clients and attorneys is to
consider whether the communication is necessary at all. By
limiting the number of potentially harmful privileged com-
munications, the risks associated with a forced waiver of at-
torney-client privilege or work product immunity can be
minimized.
2. The Opinion Letter
a. Level of Care When Writing the Opinion Letter
An opinion letter should be well-reasoned, well-grounded
in fact and law, and should accurately set forth whether the
alleged activities infringe the patent. A patent attorney who
carelessly researches and writes a patent infringement opin-
ion letter for a client not only risks exposing the client to po-
tential liability, but may also severely limit his options in the
event of litigation.
For example, if a patent attorney carelessly writes an
opinion letter that states: "although the patent is valid, the
client's activities do not infringe any claim of the patent," the
patent attorney would effectively preclude himself or herself
from asserting a patent invalidity defense in the event of fu-
ture litigation. Further, if the client is served with a com-
plaint for patent infringement and the patent attorney files a
response with the court asserting a defense of patent invalid-
ity, the attorney may face liability in accordance with Rule 11
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 21 ' because the re-
sponse would contradict the contents of the original opinion
letter.
Therefore, it is vital that opinion letters are researched,
reasoned and written with due care. Further, because the
opinion letter is generally produced in order to provide a de-
ney-cient privilege when disclosed communications are non-confidential
communications).
211. FED. R. Cirv. P. 11. The Rule states in pertinent part:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the
signer that the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper;
that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information and belief
formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is war-
ranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, mod-
ification, or reversal of existing law .... If a pleading, motion, or other
paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or on its
own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a repre-
sented party, or both, an appropriate sanction ....
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fense against willful infringement, the patent attorney
should consider the written opinion to be a public document.
In this respect, everything the attorney writes in the opinion
letter should be viewed as material which may potentially be
used against the client and the attorney.
b. When to Disclose the Opinion Letter
One could argue that the only time an alleged infringer
needs to disclose an opinion letter is when the opinion letter
is wrong. Disclosure would be in defense of a successful in-
fringement charge when determining willfulness with regard
to damages. Opinion letters are often requested, however, to
be disclosed during the liability phase of a trial and can have
the effect of aiding the plaintiff. For instance, some aspects
of even the most well-reasoned letter may need to be re-
treated from in light of additional discovery. Additionally,
there is the danger that a jury may consider willfulness as a
substitute for infringement or invalidity.
(1) In Camera Inspection
Once the attorney-client privilege or work product immu-
nity is waived and the defendant is compelled to produce
otherwise privileged documents, the defendant may move for
an in camera inspection 212 to determine their necessity at, for
example, the liability phase of trial. After the in camera in-
spection, the judge may rule that certain documents do not
need to be introduced, or at least that certain irrelevant prej-
udicial statements could be omitted from the documents
before they are introduced into evidence. In the event a court
finds the documents to be privileged, the court can issue pro-
tective orders to protect the privilege.
213
One problem with an in camera inspection in non-jury
trials is that even if the party asserting the privilege
prevails, the judge may be prejudicially influenced by the con-
212. "Under certain circumstances, a trial judge may inspect a document
which counsel wishes to use at trial in his chambers before ruling on its admis-
sibility or its use...." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 760 (6th ed. 1990).
213. See, e.g., Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Dev. Corp., 172
U.S.P.Q. 642, 644 (N.D. 111. 1972).
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tents of the inspected documents because the judge "may
have already read the dirty laundry."2 14
(2) Rule 42(b) Separation of Trial
As stated previously, Title 35 of United States Code Sec-
tion 284 provides courts with the discretion to award treble
damages in willful infringement patent actions.2 15 When de-
fending against a willful infringement allegation, the alleged
infringer often has no other choice but to waive the attorney-
client privilege and introduce into evidence otherwise privi-
leged communications to show that the defendant had a good-
faith state of mind. These privileged communications can be
prejudicial and may influence the outcome of liability.
To avoid this situation, the alleged infringer may find it
necessary to move for a bifurcated trial as provided for in
Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.216 A bi-
furcated trial would create separate trials for liability and
damages.2 17 The Federal Circuit in Quantum Corp. v.
Tandon Corp.218 recognized the predicament that willful pat-
ent infringement defendants face when it stated: "Trial
courts... should give serious consideration to a separate trial
on willfulness whenever the particular attorney-client com-
munications, once inspected by the court in camera, reveal
that the defendant is indeed confronted with this di-
lemma."2 19 If the motion is granted, evidence concerning the
alleged infringer's willfulness will not be used for the liability
trial.
In filing a motion pursuant to Rule 42(b), a defendant
may argue that judicial economy is served in granting the
214. Michael Macklin, Protecting Privileged Papers: Lawyer-Client Docu-
ments Are No Longer the Ultimate Safe Harbor, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 8, 1993, at
18.
215. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
216. FEDERAL RULE OF CIL PROCEDURE 42(b) states:
The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when
separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order
a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party
claim, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims,
counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues, always preserving invio-
late the right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to
the Constitution or as given by a statute of the United States.
FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b).
217. Id.
218. 940 F.2d 642 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
219. Id. at 644.
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motion because discovery and consideration of otherwise
privileged evidence would be unnecessary if no liability is
found at the first trial. This argument was successfully used
in Rohm and Haas Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp.,22° where the court
granted a motion to delay discovery of evidence concerning
willfulness during the liability phase of the trial. The court
reasoned that "economy, convenience, and expediency" would
be served by granting the motion.22 '
It is not always easy, however, for an alleged patent in-
fringer to move successfully for a bifurcation of trial phases
in accordance with Rule 42(b). The district court in Kimberly-
Clark Corp. v. James River Corp. of Virginia222 stated that
"bifurcation should not be routinely ordered."223 The court
reasoned that the traditional role of a factfinder is to "make
an ultimate determination on the basis of a case presented in
its entirety."224 Nonetheless, courts have ordered bifurcation
of trials in certain cases and delayed discovery of communi-
cations related to "willfulness" until after liability was
determined.2 25
°In a recent decision, the district court in Neorx Corp. v.
Immunomedics Inc.226 relied upon the holding in Quan-
tuM. 227 The court held that once an alleged infringer asserts
that he or she is faced with the dilemma identified in Quan-
tum, "a trial court should inspect the defendant's attorney-
client documents in camera to ascertain that the dilemma is
legitimate. If the dilemma is real,... bifurcation of the will-
fulness issue is an appropriate way to proceed."228 Thus, the
court held that if it is determined that early discovery of a
defendant's documents would unfairly prejudice the defend-
ant with regard to liability, the court can sever the issues of
liability and willfulness.22 9
220. 654 F. Supp. 82 (D. Del. 1987).
221. Id. at 86-87.
222. 131 F.R.D. 607 (N.D. Ga. 1989).
223. Id. at 608 (citing FED. R. CIv. P. 42(b), Advisory Committee Notes).
224. Kimberly-Clark, 131 F.R.D. at 608 (emphasis added).
225. Swofford v. B & W, Inc., 336 F.2d 406, 414-15 (5th Cir. 1964); Tyler
Refrigeration Corp. v. Kysor Indus. Corp., 601 F. Supp. 590, 607 (D. Del. 1985).
226. 28 U.S.P.Q.2d 1395 (D.N.J. 1993).
227. Quantum Corp. v. Tandon Corp., 940 F.2d 642 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
228. Neorx, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1396.
229. Id. at 1397.
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(3) Waiting Until After Discovery Cut-Off
A sly tactic an alleged patent infringer could undertake
is to assert the attorney-client privilege throughout discov-
ery and then waive the privilege after discovery has already
been completed. The defendant could then introduce into evi-
dence a favorable opinion letter, or equivalent, and the oppos-
ing party would not be able to compel production of more doc-
uments because discovery has already been completed.
In the interest of fairness, however, courts would likely
rule that a waiver should be made early enough in discovery
to allow the opposing party opportunity to rely on the waiver
during discovery and the trial. The district court considered
this situation in Gaull v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc.23 0 In that
case, the defendant chose to assert the attorney-client privi-
lege and refuse production of opinions. The court reasoned
that the defendant was free to make this decision, but as a
consequence, he or she would be precluded from waiving the
attorney-client privilege later in the proceeding. The court
reasoned "lifi privileged material is to be used at trial, the
plaintiff must be allowed to examine the privileged docu-
ments ... in order to conduct pre-trial discovery."
231
V. PROPOSAL
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit should pro-
mulgate a standard which presumes that the attorney-client
privilege protects technical communications between inven-
tors and their patent attorneys during the prosecution of pat-
ent applications. Enlightened lower district courts have al-
ready begun moving towards extending such protection, as
demonstrated by decisions such as Advanced Cardiovascular
Systems v. C.R. Bard, Inc. and Ball Corp. v. American Na-
tional Can Co.232 A substantive Federal Circuit decision
adopting the reasoning articulated in these decisions would
furnish a uniform rule district courts could follow and, ac-
cordingly, encourage full and candid disclosure of information
between patent attorneys and their respective clients.
With regard to the implicit waiver of the attorney-client
privilege resulting from compelled disclosure of an opinion of
230. 687 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
231. Id. at 83.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 86-97.
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counsel as a defense to willful patent infringement, the Fed-
eral Circuit should adopt a substantive rule which uniformly
allows patent infringement defendants the option of condi-
tionally withholding disclosure of opinion letters without
prejudice until liability is determined and the court considers
willfulness issues. Such a ruling could be effected by apply-
ing the rationale offered in Quantum v. Tandon Corp.,2s3 as
applied by the district court in Neorx Corp. v. Immunomedics
Inc.23 4 Moreover, such a ruling would not conflict with the
Underwater Devices standard, which set forth the affirmative
duty for potential infringers to exercise due care in determin-
ing whether they are infringing,23 5 because breach of this
duty would be material only to the issue of willfulness.23 6
VI. CONCLUSION
Attorney-client privilege and work product immunity are
two fundamental doctrines of our adversarial judicial system
that help preserve the requisite confidential nature of the at-
torney-client relationship. Unfortunately, the protection pro-
vided by the two doctrines may be overcome or waived with
relative ease in patent litigation through a forced or inadver-
tent waiver. A charge of willful patent infringement will usu-
ally result in an implicit waiver of attorney-client privilege
once an alleged infringer asserts his, often, only meaningful
defense of good faith reliance on an opinion of counsel. The
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit should recognize the
harsh dilemma faced by defendants charged with willful pat-
ent infringement, and should set forth substantive rules to
resolve justly this unfortunate situation. Moreover, the Fed-
eral Circuit should also recognize that communications be-
tween the inventor and the patent attorney during patent
prosecution should be presumptively protected by the attor-
ney-client privilege because dialogue between the inventor
and the patent attorney is largely legal in nature. Until
then, use of good judgment, discretion, and the suggestions
outlined by this comment in all attorney-client communica-
233. See supra text and accompanying notes 218-19.
234. See supra text and accompanying notes 226-29.
235. See supra text and accompanying notes 174-76.
236. See supra text and accompanying notes 219, 228.
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tions may reduce or eliminate the potentially harmful results
of compulsory production of privileged documents.
James Y. Go
